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Abstract 
This paper examines whether revenue decentralization and direct external 
financial supervision affect the incidence and strength of political budget 
cycles, using a panel of Israeli municipalities during the period 1999-2009.  
We find that high dependence on central government transfers—as 
reflected in a low share of locally raised revenues in the municipality’s 
budget—exacerbates political budget cycles, while tight 
monitoring—exercised through central government appointment of 
external accountants to debt accumulating municipalities—eliminates 
them. These results suggest that political budget cycles can result from 
fiscal institutions that create soft budget constraints: that is, where 
incumbents and rational voters can expect that the costs of pre-election 
expansions will be partly covered later by the central government.  
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1. Introduction 
A wide body of political economy literature debates the existence and potential determinants of 
political budget cycles – broadly defined as the manipulation of fiscal policy by incumbent 
politicians, and in particular accumulation of deficits – when an election is imminent (Drazen, 
2008; Alesina, 1989; Alesina et al., 1993; Akhmedov and Zhuavskaya, 2004). According to 
theoretical contributions, electoral manipulation of fiscal policy can be effective in contexts 
where voters are not fully rational (Nordhaus, 1975) or imperfectly informed (Brender and 
Drazen, 2005; Shi and Svensson, 2006; Alt and Lassen, 2006), or where economic cycles 
induced by the manipulation of fiscal variables can serve as a signal of the incumbent 
government’s competence (Cukierman and Meltzer, 1986; Rogoff and Siber, 1988; Rogoff, 
1990). As distortions in fiscal policy for purely electoral reasons may have significant economic 
costs, it is important to understand under what conditions such manipulation is most likely to 
occur. 
 
A widely cited factor affecting the tendency of politicians to generate political budget cycles is 
the lack of accurate real-time information for voters regarding the status of public finances and 
the economy (Drazen, 2008; Eslava, 2011). The relevance of such information stems from the 
argument, supported by empirical evidence (e.g., Brender and Drazen, 2008; Brender, 2003), 
that if voters are aware of the manipulation they might actually "punish" the incumbent at the 
polls, recognizing the inefficiencies caused by the manipulation.  
 
In this paper, we examine the possibility that if some of the costs of electoral fiscal 
manipulations could be shifted outside the jurisdiction – e.g. to the central government – it may 
affect voters’ attitudes towards the manipulation and, accordingly, the tendency of local policy 
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makers to induce political budget cycles. This possibility may explain why political budget 
cycles are more commonly found to exist in subnational elections2, than in national ones. We 
thus study how revenue decentralization, reflected in the share of locally generated revenues, 
affects the incidence of political budget cycles. For that purpose we use dynamic analysis of a 
panel of Israeli municipalities over the period 1999-2009. We focus on two institutional 
characteristics that were simultaneously present during this period: the degree of revenue 
decentralization and whether the municipality was subjected to tight central oversight exercised 
by the appointment of external accountants by the central government. 
 
Regarding the degree of self-financing, the respective figures vary among Israeli municipalities. 
While some finance their expenses mostly with locally raised revenues, many rely heavily on 
central government transfers. We hypothesize that the incentives to run deficits for electoral 
reasons are lower in municipalities that rely strongly on locally raised revenues, presumably 
because voters are aware that deficits imply higher local taxes or curtailed services in the future. 
Local politicians in such municipalities may thus anticipate that deficits will not lead to electoral 
rewards (Brender, 2003). In contrast, politicians and voters in municipalities that rely on central 
transfers may reasonably expect that deficits will induce higher transfers in the future (Meloni 
and Tommasi, 2012). The possibility to have the central government and thus the fiscal 
commons cover deficits may facilitate overspending and specifically the emergence of political 
budget cycles (Weingast et al., 1981). 
 
As for central government monitoring, from 2003 onward the Israeli central government 
appointed external accountants to several highly indebted municipalities and to municipalities 
that were poorly managed financially. These accountants had the special authority to monitor 
                                                 
2  Studies that examined this issue at the subnational level include Blais and Nadeau (1992), Galli and Rossi 
(2002), Khemani (2004), Akhmedov and Zhuavskaya (2004), Coelho et al. (2006), Veiga and Veiga (2007), Cole 
(2009), Aidt et al. (2011), Dahlberg and Mörk ( 2011), Foremny et al. (2014), Tepe and Vanhuysse ( 2014) and 
Baskaran et al. (2015). 
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fiscal policy operations, and in particular to stop payment in cases of deficits. It is likely that 
such central oversight limits the ability of municipalities to generate electoral cycles in fiscal 
policy, or at least increases the likelihood that such attempts will be exposed in real-time. We 
therefore control for this effect, as it may be negatively correlated with the magnitude of the 
political budget cycles, as well as with the share of locally generated revenues.3 However, based 
on past limited success with alternative measures, e.g., a ban on bank borrowing without 
ministerial approval, reporting requirements and recovery programs, it is also possible that 
municipalities are able to evade the supervision and accumulate deficits during election years 
despite the central oversight. 
 
Our empirical results suggest that significant political budget cycles exist in Israeli local 
elections: controlling for the other variables, municipal deficits are on average 8 percentage 
points larger in local election years than in other years. However, further analysis also shows 
that cycles are less pronounced in municipalities that rely mostly on locally raised revenues, and 
do not exist in those subject to centrally appointed accountants. These findings imply that 
deficits are likely associated with electoral costs for local politicians if they may lead to higher 
taxes in the future. Previous empirical support for this notion is offered by Brender (2003) and 
Drazen and Eslava (2010), who find that deficits indeed lead to electoral losses in Israeli and 
Colombian local elections, respectively. We find, first, that low dependence on central transfers 
dampens political budget cycles, but they remain significant. Second, enforced control by the 
central government through external accountants turns political budget cycles statistically 
insignificant. Our results thus imply that either strong central oversight or significant revenue 
decentralization can limit opportunistic behavior by incumbent local governments. The worst 
                                                 
3 The mean share of locally generated revenues in total revenues among localities that had an external accountant 
was 51% and among those that did not have one it was 61%. There is a broad range of overlap between the two 
groups with respect to the share of locally generated revenues. 
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institutional setup appears to be when a high degree of local fiscal autonomy is combined with 
strong reliance on central transfers. 
 
Our contribution to the literature is in exploring the role of fiscal decentralization and soft 
budget constraints as potential determinants of political budget cycles. Several other potential 
determinants have previously been discussed in the literature. Brender and Drazen (2005), for 
example, study whether the incidence of political budget cycles differs between new and 
established democracies. Their results indicate that experience with democratic politics and the 
quality of information as well as information transmission are important conditioning factors for 
the existence of the cycles. Furthermore, fiscal rules have been found to be important for the 
strength of political budget cycles (Rose, 2006). Another factor that may affect the incidence of 
political budget cycles is the existence of term limits for elected politicians (Klein and Sakurai, 
2015). While such determinants of political budget cycles have been discussed in the literature4, 
the impact of fiscal decentralization and central government oversight, the main focus of our 
study, remains largely unexplored.5 
 
The second branch of the literature to which our paper contributes is the fiscal federalism 
literature on the link between intergovernmental transfers and subnational borrowing. Many 
theoretical contributions suggest that reliance on central transfers creates undesirable incentives 
for subnational governments and may lead them to over-borrow. Specifically, if local 
governments expect that deficits in the current period will cause the central government to 
increase transfers in the future, incentives to run prudent fiscal policies will be diminished, 
                                                 
4 See also for other possible determinants Nie et al. (2013) who find that the amplitude of any electoral cycle 
depends inter alia on media exposure, and Schneider (2010) who argues that the degree of fiscal transparency 
matters. De Haan and Klomp (2013) provide a recent survey of the literature on the determinants of political 
business cycles. 
5 Meloni and Tommasi (2012) show in a related study for Argentina that reliance on central transfers causes voters 
to demand more spending (a finding replicated in our results below, that higher locally raised revenues are 
associated with smaller per-capita deficits). However, they do not focus on the interactions between fiscal 
dependence and political budget cycles. Instead, the argument is used to explain the finding that higher deficits 
result in electoral gains in Argentina. 
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leading to soft budget constraints and subnational over-borrowing (Kornai, 1979; Kornai, 1986; 
Rodden, 2002; Rodden et al., 2003). Our results support these theoretical predictions by 
showing that Israeli local governments which rely on transfers are more likely to run deficits in 
general (controlling for local characteristics that may account for both larger transfers and 
deficits), as well as for electoral reasons. Our results hence add to previous empirical findings on 
the link between intergovernmental transfers and soft budget constraints in fiscal federations. 
Pettersson-Lidbom (2010), for example, shows that expected future transfers may lead to 
subnational over-borrowing in Swedish municipalities. Baskaran (2012) reaches a similar 
conclusion for the German Länder. Sola and Palomba (2015) find that capital markets, when 
pricing the risk premia of subnational governments, are less responsive to fiscal fundamentals 
when soft budget constraints, in the form of higher shares of central government transfers, exist. 
However, these studies neither focus on elections nor tie soft budget constraints to political 
budget cycles. Thus, to our knowledge, our paper is the first to show empirically that 
ill-designed fiscal federalism institutions can exacerbate the fiscal inefficiencies typically 
associated with electoral manipulation. 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the fiscal and 
political institutions at the local level in Israel. Section 3 discusses the empirical framework and 
data. The results are reported in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Institutional details 
Our empirical analysis deals with Israeli municipalities during the years 1999-2009. In 2009, 
there were 200 municipalities in Israel. 6  One hundred and twenty municipalities were 
                                                 
6 The analysis does not include the 54 regional municipalities. This is because the political system in regional 
municipalities operates differently than in local municipalities. Regional municipalities are comprised of several 
settlements, each receiving a seat on the council. In addition, the number of municipalities changed in 2003 
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predominantly comprised of Jewish residents, while 80 had a majority of Arab residents. This 
classification is important since Jewish and Arab municipalities are very different both 
economically and politically. First, Arab municipalities tend to be much poorer than Jewish ones 
(Reingewertz, 2015) and, hence, rely more heavily on central government transfers. They also 
tend to have higher debt levels and therefore face stricter central government monitoring, 
including the appointment of external accountants (Ben Bassat et al., 2013). Second, voters in 
Arab municipalities were found to vote according to clan affiliation (Ben Bassat and Dahan 
2012; Reingewertz, 2015; Hillman et al., 2015), rather than according to local government 
performance. These characteristics imply that the Arab municipalities are less relevant to the 
questions we study. Thus, we focus on the 120 Jewish municipalities, of which 6 were subject to 
a population composition change as a result of centrally enforced amalgamation. Therefore, our 
final sample includes 114 municipalities.  
 
The average municipal population in our sample is 31,000, but population sizes vary 
considerably and range from 1,300 to 748,000 residents. Local governments in Israel, much like 
in most other developed economies, provide various municipal services, such as garbage 
collection, lighting, and sewage. In addition, Israeli municipalities are in charge of education 
provision (funded predominantly by specific transfers from the central government), road 
maintenance, and, partly, welfare. In 2007, 7% of GDP was spent by local governments, 
accounting for about 15% of total public expenditure. About 65% of municipal revenues came 
from taxation and other locally generated resources. The remaining 35% were grants from the 
central government. The extent to which a municipality relies on grant funding is highly 
dependent on its socioeconomic status: municipalities with low socioeconomic status tend to 
rely on government transfers much more than their rich counterparts. Since the socioeconomic 
                                                                                                                                                         
because of an amalgamation reform (Reingewertz, 2012). In the empirical analysis, we drop the six Jewish 
municipalities that were affected by the amalgamation of 2003 (Modiin, Yehud-Monoson, Binyamina-Givat Ada, 
Kadima-Tzoran, Kochav Yair, Savion).  
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status of localities is almost fixed over time, we control for it by using a municipality fixed effect 
in our econometric estimation below. 
 
The political system at the local level is only partially linked to the national level. Local 
candidates are usually not tied to national parties; the agenda in local elections is usually not 
focused on national-partisan topics, and focuses on local issues. Moreover, local results do not 
mirror national results (Diskin and Eden, 1999). The elections are held using two ballots: one for 
the mayor and one for the party in the local council. This creates a presidential system where the 
budget is prepared by the mayor but has to be approved by the council. The mayor holds 
considerable power, but the local council acts as a veto player that can block budget proposals 
(Brender, 2003; Diskin and Eden, 1999). 
 
Israel's intergovernmental relations are formally highly centralized. The central government 
determines a general annual change in local tax rates, approves each local decision to deviate 
from this rate, and has to approve the local budget. In addition, as mentioned above, many local 
governments depend on funding from the central level. However, effectively, the supervisory 
abilities of the Ministry of Interior at the specific locality level are limited, so the municipalities 
enjoy significant de facto autonomy, especially when they do not require special financial aid 
from the central government. Substantial reforms that were introduced from the mid-1990s have 
formalized the transfers, determining them predominantly according to objective criteria that are 
unrelated to the short-term fiscal performance of the municipalities (Brender, 2003). This was a 
major change from the past practice when annual changes in the transfers were based to a large 
extent on past deficits. Nevertheless, even today, some transfers are made where deficits 
emerge. When municipalities run into financial distress and need government support, the 
central government tends in many cases to apply "recovery programs", which may be 
demanding, in return for this aid. Recovery programs are specifically tailored to each 
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municipality. They include two main components: an increase in central government transfers to 
reduce municipal debt, and a set of fiscal goals, such as maintaining a balanced budget through 
budget cuts and an increase in local tax collection. Despite these ambitious goals, in practice 
recovery programs do not have significant budgetary effects, except for debt reduction due to 
central government transfers (Ben Bassat et al., 2013).  
 
One of the mechanisms used by the Ministry of Interior in order to regulate the activities of 
financially distressed or poorly managed local governments is the appointment of external 
accountants (Ben Bassat et al., 2013). Their responsibility is to oversee municipal fiscal policy, 
with the purpose of balancing the budget, rather than to dictate specific spending or revenue 
programs.7 The appointment of external accountants is a relatively new tool used by the Israeli 
central government that was introduced through legislative amendments adopted in 2003. 
External accountants have been shown to be an effective tool for fiscal restraint (Ben Bassat 
et al., 2013; Steklov, 2008) though their effect during election years remains unexplored. 
 
3. Empirical design and data 
3.1 Data 
We use political, budgetary, and socioeconomic data of municipalities in Israel from 1999 to 
2009. For the reasons outlined above, we focus on the Jewish municipalities.8 The data were 
obtained from publications of the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS) and from 
administrative data provided by the Ministry of Interior (summary of the audited financial data 
of the Municipalities’ Audit Department, various years). In Table 1 we report a list of the main 
                                                 
7 In the most extreme cases the central government demotes the elected local government and nominates a 
convened committee. A convened committee is a bureaucratic committee, appointed by the central government, 
which replaces the mayor. 
8 As shown in Table 6 the results are qualitatively unaffected when we analyze Jewish and Arab municipalities 
jointly. 
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variables and their definitions. Election data were also collected from the Ministry of Interior 
(Elections Supervision Unit). Local elections take place every five years, with 2003 and 2008 
being the election years in our sample. Due to various reasons, some municipalities had 
elections on other dates.9 Since the change in election date is potentially endogenous to the 
financial situation of the municipality, and because “convened committees” are irrelevant for 
the question we examine, we exclude these cases from the sample. We also drop six 
municipalities that were subject to amalgamations. Thus, of a total of 120 Jewish municipalities, 
our final sample includes 114 municipalities. 
  
The dependent variable is the annual per-capita deficit, defined as the percentage change in debt 
per-capita. The main independent variables of interest are the dummies for local elections and 
their interactions. The two local election campaigns were held in November 2003 and 2008, i.e., 
towards the end of the fiscal year. Further important variables are a variable measuring the 
degree of revenue decentralization, i.e.. the share of locally generated revenues in total revenues 
of the municipality (“own revenues”) and a dummy for whether a municipality had an external 
accountant. 
 
As additional covariates that may affect both the main variables of interest and deficits, we 
always include the number of inhabitants in a municipality, the local unemployment rate, a 
dummy for whether or not a municipality has a high level of debt (higher debt per-capita than the 
respective median municipality), and the volume of central government transfers per-capita. We 
also control for the lagged dependent variable.10 
 
                                                 
9 Some municipalities were managed by a “convened committee”. In these cases elections were held when the term 
of the convened committee ends and not on the same date as the national cycle.  
10 Robustness tests with respect to these specifications are reported in Table 7. 
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Table 2 presents summary statistics for the main variables used in the analysis. Local authorities 
have an average surplus of 0.024, i.e., they reduce their debt per-capita by 2.4 percent annually 
on average, but the standard error is 0.154, showing the large variance in deficits across 
municipalities. To account for outliers, we drop the top and bottom 1% for the deficit variable 
when calculating the summary statistics, i.e. all observations below the 1st and above the 99th 
percentile. We also omit these outliers in the regression analysis presented below. 
 
Table 2 furthermore shows that about 8 percent of observations were subject to an external 
accountant during the sample period. The average share of “own revenues” was about 60 
percent, but there is again significant variation across municipalities – the highest own revenue 
share in our sample is 95 percent, while the lowest is 13 percent. There is also substantial 
variance in unemployment rates and transfer receipts between municipalities.  
 
3.2 Empirical model 
We examine the link between deficits and elections by analyzing a panel of Jewish 
municipalities for the years 1999-2009. The baseline model is as follows:  
Equation (1):  
∆ logሺܾ݀݁ݐሻ௜,௧ ൌ ∆ logሺܾ݀݁ݐሻ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚܧ݈݁ܿݐ݅݋݊௜,௧ ൅ ߜܧݔݐ݁ݎ݈݊ܽ௜,௧൅	ܱ߮ݓ݊	ݎ݁ݒ݁݊ݑ݁ݏ௜,௧ ൅
ߛଵ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ߛଶܫ௧ ൅ ߙ௜ ൅ ߳௜,௧, 
 where ∆ logሺܾ݀݁ݐሻ௜,௧ is the first difference of log debt per-capita of municipality i in 
year t, which is essentially the deficit. ∆ logሺܾ݀݁ݐሻ௜,௧ିଵ  is the lagged value of deficit; 
ܧ݈݁ܿݐ݅݋݊௜,௧	is a dummy variable for the year local elections took place; ܧݔݐ݁ݎ݈݊ܽ௜,௧ is a dummy 
for municipalities that are subject to an external accountant, and ܱݓ݊	ݎ݁ݒ݁݊ݑ݁ݏ௜,௧ is the ratio 
of locally raised revenues to total revenues. As indicated above, the vector ௜ܺ,௧ includes further 
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control variables, specifically the number of inhabitants, the unemployment rate, the dummy for 
high debt, and equalization transfers from the central government, while ܫ௧	is a trend variable to 
account for common developments regarding the deficit.11 ߙ௜	are municipality fixed effects.  
 
While the model specified in Equation (1) can be used to estimate the existence of political 
budget cycles, our main interest is to understand whether they are more pronounced under 
certain fiscal institutions, specifically when a municipality is characterized by a large share of 
“own revenues” or subject to tight external supervision. Thus, our main specification includes 
interaction terms between the election dummy and both the dummy for external accountants and 
the “own revenues” variable: 
 
Equation (2): 
∆ logሺܾ݀݁ݐሻ௜,௧ ൌ ∆ logሺܾ݀݁ݐሻ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚܧ݈݁ܿݐ݅݋݊௜,௧൅	ߜଵܧݔݐ݁ݎ݈݊ܽ௜,௧ ൅ ߜଶܧ݈݁ܿݐ݅݋݊௜,௧ ൈ
ܧݔݐ݁ݎ݈݊ܽ௜,௧ ൅ ߮ଵܱݓ݊	ݎ݁ݒ݁݊ݑ݁ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߮ଶܧ݈݁ܿݐ݅݋݊௜,௧ ൈ ܱݓ݊	ݎ݁ݒ݁݊ݑ݁ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ߛଵ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ߛଶܫ௜,௧ ൅
ߙ௜ ൅ ߳௜,௧,  
where all the variables are defined as above. 
 
3.3 Estimation method 
While the above models include municipality fixed effects, it has been shown that the standard 
fixed effects estimator is biased when the model includes a lagged dependent variable (Nickell, 
1981). Although the bias vanishes in large panels (T>30), our panel covers only about 10 years. 
Judson and Owen (1999) offer simulation evidence that the System-GMM estimator performs 
well for such samples (Blundell and Bond, 1998 and 2000). Thus, we use the System-GMM 
                                                 
11 Note that we cannot include year dummies because the local elections in our sample are held in all municipalities 
at the same date. 
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estimate as the main estimator; however, we also explore the robustness of the results to other 
estimation methods further below. The main feature of the System-GMM estimator is to 
instrument the lagged dependent variable with further lags of the dependent variable. In 
addition, it estimates Equation (2) both in level form and in first-differences to increase 
efficiency. For hypothesis tests, we always use cluster and heteroscedasticity robust standard 
errors. The unit of clustering is a given municipality. 
 
4.  Results 
4.1 Baseline results 
Figure 1 shows descriptive evidence regarding the existence of political budget cycles in Israeli 
municipalities. Comparing raw averages, we observe that average deficits are larger, by about 
five percentage points, in election years than in non-election years. However, it remains to be 
seen whether this result survives more rigorous tests. 
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Figure 1. Average Municipal Deficit in Election and Non-election Years^: 1999-200912 
 
^ The upper and lower horizontal lines represent the 95% confidence intervals. 
Column (I) of Table 3 estimates a variant of Equation (1). Consistent with the graphical 
evidence presented above, we observe a significantly positive effect of elections on deficits. The 
growth rate of debt is on average about 8 percentage points higher in election years than in 
non-election years. We also find that external accountants lead to lower deficits: municipalities 
that are subject to an external accountant have on average a deficit that is about 8 percentage 
points lower. Finally, we find that an increase in the share of locally generated revenues by one 
percentage point on average decreases deficits by 0.18 percentage points. Thus, an increase in 
the “own revenues” share from 25% to 75% would decrease deficits on average by about 9 
percentage points 
 
In Column (II) we include the interaction between external accountants and the election dummy. 
The interaction effect is significant and negative; suggesting that the electoral cycle is less 
pronounced in municipalities that have an appointed external accountant. We interpret this 
                                                 
12 Figures are the simple averages of the change in all the localities in our sample. 
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interaction effect in more detail below. First, however, we report in Column (III) results where 
we interact the “own revenues” variable with the election dummy. We again observe a 
significant interaction effect. In Model (IV), we include both interactions. The results are similar 
to those in Columns (II) and (III), respectively, and the coefficients of both interactions are not 
affected substantially by their joint inclusion in the equation. The diagnostic tests perform 
reasonably well in all models. The Hansen-J over-identification test is never rejected while there 
is also no evidence of second-order autocorrelation. First-order autocorrelation is expected and 
does not invalidate the estimates.   
 
To interpret Table 3 (Model IV) in more detail, we plot in Figure 2 the marginal effect of 
elections on the percentage change of debt in municipalities with and without external 
accountants, depending on the share of locally raised revenues in their overall income (“own 
revenues”).13 Subfigure (a) suggests that elections have a significantly positive effect on deficits 
in municipalities without external accountants at all plausible levels of “own revenues” – 
although the effect diminishes as “own revenues” increases. For example, in municipalities that 
would have the minimum “own revenues” share in our sample, which is about 13%, deficits 
would be on average 17 percentage points higher during election years. In contrast, in 
municipalities that would have the highest revenues share, about 95%, the election effect is 
about 4 percentage points. Thus, this plot indicates that revenue decentralization can dampen the 
political budget cycle substantially, but not fully eliminate it. Subfigure (b) suggests that where 
external accountants are nominated, the political budget cycle is essentially non-existent, as the 
marginal effect is not significantly larger than zero by statistical means at any level of “own 
revenues”. Specifically, while the election effect at the minimum value of “own revenues” is 
about 3 percentage points, it is about -10 at the maximum.  
 
                                                 
13 For a discussion of how to present and interpret interaction models, see Brambor et al. (2006). 
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Figure 2a. The Effect of Election Years and the Share of Locally Generated Revenues on 
Municipal Deficits: No External Accountant (ratio of previous year's debt per-capita)^ 
 
^ The upper and lower horizontal lines represent the 90% confidence intervals. 
 
Figure 2b. The Effect of Election Years and the Share of Locally Generated Revenues on 
Municipal Deficits: With an External Accountant (ratio of previous year's debt 
per-capita)^ 
 
^ The upper and lower horizontal lines represent the 90% confidence intervals. 
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While “own revenues” and external accountants reduce deficits particularly in election years, 
the results continue to suggest that both factors also have a dampening effect on deficits in 
general. That is, the “base” effect of both variables is significantly negative in Model (IV). 
 
We also observe significant coefficients for the other covariates. First, there is some persistence 
in deficits. Municipalities that had a higher deficit in the previous year continue to have higher 
deficits in the current year. A higher unemployment rate increases the deficit (although the last 
two variables are not significant when we use the fixed effects estimation). A high stock of debt 
also leads to higher deficits, either because municipalities have to pay higher interest rates - 
because the principal is higher - or because it reflects other unobservable characteristics related 
to the conduct of local fiscal policy. Transfers have a negative effect on deficits. Finally, there 
does not seem to be a common trend regarding the deficit during our sample period. 
 
4.2 Robustness tests 
4.2.1 Other estimation methods 
In Table 4 we report results from a replication of the baseline models with estimation methods 
other than System-GMM with the full instrument set, notably the standard within fixed effects 
estimator, Anderson-Hsiao (Anderson and Hsiao, 1981), Difference-GMM (Arellano and Bond, 
1991), and System-GMM with less than the full instrument set.  
 
While less efficient than System-GMM, the advantage of the Anderson-Hsiao and 
Difference-GMM estimation methods is that they are less susceptible to the “too many 
instruments” problem (Roodman, 2008). In particular, the problem of instrument proliferation 
reflects the fact that with increasing instrument count the Hansen-J statistics become weak and 
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unreliable, causing an over-rejection of the test for joint instrument validity. Similarly, the 
simple within fixed effects estimator is not affected by the instrument proliferation problem as it 
does not use any instruments. Despite being biased, this estimator may be informative as it is 
consistent for large T. Finally, another strategy to deal with instrument proliferation is to reduce 
the number of instruments within the System-GMM approach by either collapsing the 
instrument set or limiting the lag length. 
 
Column (I) of Table 4 reports the results from the within-estimator. We find that the results are 
similar, both in magnitude and with respect to statistical significance, to the baseline findings. 
Column (II) collects the Anderson-Hsiao results. The Anderson-Hsiao first-differences model is 
similar to the empirical model as specified in Equation (2), but it uses as an instrument for the 
first-difference of the lagged dependent variable the second lag of the first difference.14 Thus, 
the Anderson-Hsiao estimator uses only one instrument. We again find that the results are in line 
with the baseline results. The interactions between the election dummy and both “own 
revenues” and the external accountants dummy are negative and significant. 
 
The Difference-GMM estimator only uses one differenced version of Equation (2) to estimate 
the coefficients of interests. The Difference-GMM results are collected in Column (III) of Table 
4. Note that the number of instruments is lower than in the System-GMM regressions. The 
results, however, are similar. While there is on average an electoral cycle in deficits, it is less 
pronounced in municipalities that have high “own revenues” and/or have an appointed external 
accountant. 
 
                                                 
14 Another variant of the Anderson-Hsiao estimator uses the second lag of the level of the lagged dependent 
variable as the instrument. Note that we get similar results with this alternative Anderson-Hsiao estimator. 
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Next, we collect in Column (IV) System-GMM regressions with a collapsed instrument set. 
Column (V) collects System-GMM results where the lag length is limited to the second lag of 
the dependent variable. Third, despite the well-performing Hansen-J and autocorrelation tests, 
the instruments for the lagged dependent variables may be invalid if there is (second or higher 
order) autocorrelation in the error term. One way to validate the results is to use even further lags 
of the lagged dependent variable as instruments. Thus, we collect in Column (VI) System-GMM 
regressions where we only use lags starting from the third lag as an instrument. Overall, the 
System-GMM results with these alternative instrument sets are again in line with the baseline 
estimates. 
 
4.2.2 The election of 2003 
Our sample includes two election years: 2003 and 2008. Since 2003 was an eventful year in the 
Israeli economy – and for the Israeli municipalities – in a way that could potentially result in 
higher deficits that are not related to the electoral cycle, we tested whether the variables of 
interest maintain their effect when we allow for an idiosyncratic effect in 2003.15 
 
To account for the possibility that our results are driven by the developments in 2003, we report 
results where we interact our coefficients of interest with a dummy for 2003. If the regression 
results were only driven by the 2003 election, we should observe the previous patterns only for 
these interacted variables. The effect of the remaining elections, on the other hand, and their 
interactions with “own revenues” should be insignificant.16 The results are reported in Table 5. 
We first observe that the cycles in 2003 were not significantly larger than in 2008. We also find 
that the interaction of “own revenues” with election years maintains its statistical significance 
                                                 
15 In 2003, the central government adopted a fiscal consolidation plan that included reductions in the transfers to 
local authorities that were reinstated later in the year, increases in local taxation, predominantly by curtailing 
exemptions, and a public sector wage cut, including in the municipalities. 
16 The interaction for the external accountants with the election year 2003 is omitted as there was only a small 
number of external accountants in Jewish municipalities in 2003. 
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and broadly preserves its size – and that there was no statistically significant difference in its 
size in 2003. Thus, the main results—deficits in election years are smaller when a larger share of 
the municipality's revenue is raised locally or when the locality has an external accountant—do 
not reflect the special circumstances in 2003. 
 
4.2.3 Jewish and Arab municipalities 
As discussed above, the sample used to obtain our previous results includes only Jewish 
municipalities. However, a significant number of municipalities are predominantly Arab. While 
it is not useful to analyze both sets of municipalities jointly as they differ along a number of 
crucial dimensions17, we examine the robustness of our results in a sample that includes both 
types of municipalities. Results from a replication of the baseline model with such a sample are 
reported in Table 6. Comparing these results with those reported in Table 3, it can be seen that 
the estimates of the variables of interest do not depend on whether Arab municipalities are 
excluded from the sample. However, as outlined above, Arab municipalities seem less relevant 
to our setting and we therefore did not include them in the baseline regressions. 
 
4.2.4 Other robustness tests 
In Table 7 we examine the robustness of our results to various changes in the specification. In 
Column (I) we report the results when the dependent variable is the change in the debt per-capita 
of each municipality, rather than the log, to ensure that our results are not driven by large 
percentage changes in the debt of municipalities with small per-capita debts. We find that the 
results are not sensitive to this change in the specification. In Column (II) we replace the binary 
variable for the level of debt per-capita with a continuous one, again with no implication for our 
main results. In Column (III) we replace the share of locally generated revenues with its lagged 
                                                 
17  In particular electoral competition and voter turnout in Arab municipalities are strongly influenced by 
clan-affiliation (Ben Bassat and Dahan, 2012). 
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value, to account for the possibility that local administrations reduce their tax collection efforts 
in election years, hence lowering the share of “own revenues”. Our results are not affected by 
this change. Finally, in Column (IV), we add an interaction between the local unemployment 
rate and election years, to account for the possibility that cyclical economic developments in the 
election year affect the deficits. This addition has no effect on the main results. Therefore, our 
own revenues interaction actually measures the effect of decentralization on electoral 
manipulation but not of low income or socioeconomic status. In addition to these specifications 
we also experimented with additional year dummy variables, as “placebo election years”; none 
of the results relating to these years were statistically significant, nor their interactions with our 
key variables. This is supportive evidence that we are not in fact measuring some idiosyncratic 
effects biasing our estimates. Moreover, omitting control variables does not seem to change the 
findings of our baseline regressions, which is re-assuring as unobserved heterogeneity should 
also not have a substantial effect in this case (Altonji et al., 2005). 
5. Conclusion 
We study two institutional factors that affect the existence and magnitude of political budget 
cycles in local governments. Our results suggest that reliance on central government transfers 
enhances political budget cycles while tight central oversight diminishes them. Local politicians 
ostensibly restrain electorally motivated deficits if they are likely to be eventually financed by 
the municipality's residents, but they expand them if they can plausibly expect that future central 
transfers will cover a significant part of such deficits. These results thus imply that the 
magnitude of political budget cycles is exacerbated by badly designed fiscal institutions that 
lead to soft budget constraints. Soft budget constraints may lead incumbents to enhance local 
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services or to reduce tax collection efforts during their campaign, speculating that voters would 
believe that some of the cost will be borne by residents of other municipalities.18  
 
These findings imply that politicians take into account that voters are aware of their electoral 
manipulation and its inefficiency. This observation is consistent with the notion that voters are 
fiscally conservative (Peltzman, 1992; Brender, 2003; Brender and Drazen, 2008). It is thus an 
indication that political budget cycles emerge where information is imperfect (as suggested by 
Shi and Svensson, 2006, among others) or where some of the cost may be shifted to others. This 
may also suggest that in advanced economies, where information is of higher quality than in 
developing ones, political budget cycles are more likely to be found in local elections—at least 
where budget constraints are soft and some of the cost may be expected to be shifted to the 
central government—than in national ones. 
 
A potential expansion of our results is to countries that receive substantial amounts of foreign 
aid, either in the form of continuous flows or as part of an IMF loan or other multinational 
program transfers. Soft budget constraints in such programs—reflected in a willingness to 
renegotiate the program’s terms—may lead politicians in the target countries to “sweeten the 
pill” in election years, expecting that some of the burden may fall on the donor’s shoulders. 
Since one cannot expect the appointment of external accountants in an international setting, our 
results may indicate the need for strict enforcement of the original terms of such programs in 
order to contain the incentives for apolitical budget cycles in the receiving countries. 
 
                                                 
18 Brender (2003) has shown that, controlling for a large number of performance indicators, voters do not reward 
mayors who raise more resources from the central government during their term in office. Here, however, we 
examine the tendency to increase the deficit in election years without conditioning on performance – hence 
allowing for the possibility that the increased deficits were used to improve municipal services during the 
campaign.  
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Table 1: Definition of variables  
Variable  Definition  Source 
Deficit  First difference of log debt per‐capita.  MOIN 
Election  Dummy for election year.  MOIN 
“own revenues”  Share of locally raised revenue out of total revenue.  MOIN 
External  Dummy variable capturing if an external accountant was in the 
municipality in a given year.  MOIN 
Population  Population (in thousands).  ICBS 
Unemployed  Number of unemployed per 1,000 residents.  ICBS 
High debt  Dummy =1 if debt above the median debt (3,046) in the sample 
used in the regressions, 0 else.  MOIN 
Transfers p. c.  Transfers per‐capita. (1,000 NIS)  MOIN 
Note: Data was obtained from the Ministry of Interior (MOIN) and the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS). 
 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics 
N Mean Std.Dev Min  Max
Deficit  1212 ‐0.024 0.154 ‐0.575  0.703
Election  1202 0.190 0.392 0.000  1.000
External    1212 0.076 0.265 0.000  1.000
“own revenues”    1212 0.595 0.170 0.128  0.953
Population (millions)  1212 0.047 0.087 0.001  0.773
Unemployed (out of 1,000 residents)  1212 12.829 6.779 1.923  43.553
High debt  1212 0.515 0.500 0.000  1.000
Transfers p. c. (10,000 NIS)  1212 0.093 0.105 0.000  0.741
Note:  This  table  presents  summary  statistics  for  Israeli‐Jewish  municipalities.  The  sample  includes  114 
municipalities for duration of 11 years. Some observations are missing due to missing data. The regressions  in 
the following tables  include fewer observations mainly due to  lags, and partly due to missing observations for 
some variables.   
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Table 3: Electoral cycles in Israeli Jewish municipalities, 1999-2009, Baseline regressions 
         
   (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV) 
Election  0.081***  0.094***  0.171***  0.188*** 
[0.011]  [0.011]  [0.037]  [0.039] 
External  ‐0.083***  ‐0.048***  ‐0.051*** 
[0.014]  [0.014]  [0.015] 
Election x External    ‐0.137***  ‐0.140*** 
[0.029]  [0.027] 
“own revenues”  ‐0.179***  ‐0.109**  ‐0.123** 
[0.052]  [0.051]  [0.050] 
Election x “own revenues”      ‐0.145**  ‐0.157*** 
[0.058]  [0.061] 
Unemployed    0.002**  0.002***  0.002**  0.002*** 
[0.001]  [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.001] 
Population  0.010  ‐0.010  0.018  0.011 
[0.046]  [0.053]  [0.044]  [0.047] 
High debt  0.074***  0.069***  0.064***  0.073*** 
[0.011]  [0.011]  [0.011]  [0.011] 
Transfers p. c.  ‐0.315***  ‐0.095  ‐0.291***  ‐0.280*** 
[0.085]  [0.063]  [0.092]  [0.086] 
Trend  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002 
[0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002] 
y(t‐1)  0.163***  0.163***  0.173***  0.154*** 
[0.038]  [0.038]  [0.039]  [0.038] 
N  1083  1083  1083  1083 
Municipalities  114  114  114  114 
Chi2  273.610  246.823  213.644  281.238 
Hansen‐test(p‐val.)  0.282  0.252  0.273  0.332 
AR(1)‐test(p‐val.)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
AR(2)‐test(p‐val.)  0.729  0.682  0.607  0.607 
Instruments No.  63  63  63  65 
Notes:  Dependent  variable:  growth  rate  in  log  debt  per‐capita (deficit).  All  models  estimated  with 
System‐GMM using the full instrument set. Stars indicate significance levels at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***). 
Standard errors are reported  in parentheses. All models with cluster and heteroscedasticity robust standard 
errors. 
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Table 4: Robustness tests with different estimation methods 
             
   (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV)  (V)  (VI) 
Election  0.212***  0.170***  0.166***  0.176***  0.182***  0.184*** 
[0.042]  [0.039]  [0.038]  [0.040]  [0.041]  [0.037] 
External  ‐0.062***  ‐0.039  ‐0.073***  ‐0.057***  ‐0.052***  ‐0.045*** 
[0.021]  [0.027]  [0.024]  [0.014]  [0.014]  [0.017] 
Election x External  ‐0.165***  ‐0.108***  ‐0.125***  ‐0.125***  ‐0.128***  ‐0.145*** 
[0.028]  [0.027]  [0.028]  [0.026]  [0.027]  [0.026] 
“own revenues”  ‐0.163  0.023  ‐0.05  ‐0.130***  ‐0.121**  ‐0.155** 
[0.175]  [0.211]  [0.224]  [0.050]  [0.050]  [0.061] 
Election x “own 
revenues”  ‐0.208***  ‐0.133**  ‐0.122**  ‐0.144**  ‐0.148**  ‐0.163*** 
[0.065]  [0.061]  [0.059]  [0.062]  [0.062]  [0.059] 
Unemployed  0.002  0.009***  0.005***  0.002***  0.002***  0.002** 
  [0.001]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.001] 
Population  ‐0.299  ‐1.364  ‐1.057  0.011  0.012  0.021 
  [0.677]  [1.251]  [1.337]  [0.049]  [0.048]  [0.050] 
High debt  0.078***  0.133***  0.133***  0.074***  0.073***  0.080*** 
[0.016]  [0.020]  [0.021]  [0.011]  [0.011]  [0.012] 
Transfers p. c.  ‐0.450*  ‐0.719**  ‐0.706**  ‐0.290***  ‐0.276***  ‐0.332*** 
[0.231]  [0.342]  [0.294]  [0.090]  [0.086]  [0.098] 
Trend  ‐0.002    0.003  0.004**  0.003  0.002 
[0.003]    [0.004]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002] 
y(t‐1)  0.047  0.087  0.114**  0.179***  0.160***  ‐0.015 
   [0.036]  [0.158]  [0.045]  [0.042]  [0.041]  [0.117] 
Estimation method  Within FE  Anderson‐ 
Hsiao 
Difference 
GMM 
System 
GMM 
System 
GMM 
System 
GMM 
Type of instrument  2nd lag of 
difference 
Full 
instrument   
set 
Collapsed  1‐2 Lag  3 ‐ N Lag 
N  1083  854  968  1083  1083  1083 
Municipalities  114  113  113  114  114  114 
Chi2  189.287  280.561  251.554  204.360 
F  22  16 
Hansen‐test(p‐val.)  0.242  0.108  0.04  0.292 
AR(1)‐test(p‐val.)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.002 
AR(2)‐test(p‐val.)  0.997  0.479  0.58  0.334 
Instruments No.  1  55  21  37  46 
Notes:  Dependent  variable:  growth  rate  in  log  debt  per‐capita (deficit).  Models  (I)  is  estimated  with  the 
standard within fixed effects estimator. Model (II) is estimated with Anderson‐Hsiao using as instrument for the 
first difference of the  lagged dependent variable  its second  lag of the first difference (Model II). Models (III)  is 
estimated with Difference‐GMM using the full instrument set. Model (IV) is estimated with System‐GMM using 
the collapsed instrument set. Model (V) is estimated with System‐GMM using up to the second lag of the lagged 
dependent variable as instrument. Model (VI) is estimated using all lags starting from the third as instruments. 
Stars indicate significance levels at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
All models with cluster and heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. 
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Table 5: The elections of 2003  
         
   (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV) 
Election  0.109**  0.147***  0.103**  0.120** 
[0.046]  [0.056]  [0.047]  [0.054] 
Election x 2003  0.095  0.002  0.072  0.142 
[0.091]  [0.098]  [0.095]  [0.093] 
External  ‐0.058***  ‐0.042  ‐0.068***  ‐0.063***
[0.014]  [0.027]  [0.024]  [0.021] 
Election x External  ‐0.084***  ‐0.077***  ‐0.073**  ‐0.117***
[0.028]  [0.029]  [0.029]  [0.030] 
“own revenues”  ‐0.120**  0.039  ‐0.029  ‐0.164 
[0.049]  [0.209]  [0.221]  [0.176] 
Election x “own 
revenues”  ‐0.124*  ‐0.157*  ‐0.105  ‐0.142* 
[0.072]  [0.082]  [0.072]  [0.080] 
Election x “own 
revenues” x 2003  0.014  0.111  0.039  ‐0.083 
[0.141]  [0.147]  [0.144]  [0.137] 
Population  0.016  ‐1.662  ‐1.275  ‐0.403 
[0.045]  [1.330]  [1.380]  [0.664] 
Unemployed  0.002***  0.007***  0.005***  0.001 
[0.001]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.001] 
High debt  0.068***  0.129***  0.128***  0.073*** 
[0.010]  [0.020]  [0.020]  [0.016] 
Transfers p. c.  ‐0.245***  ‐0.605*  ‐0.525*  ‐0.374* 
[0.083]  [0.351]  [0.286]  [0.220] 
Trend  0.005***  0.007  0.001 
[0.002]  [0.004]  [0.003] 
y(t‐1)  0.163***  0.106  0.131***  0.055 
[0.039]  [0.156]  [0.046]  [0.036] 
Type of instrument 
System‐GMM, full 
instrument set  Anderson‐Hsiao
Difference GMM, 
full instrument 
set  Within FE 
N  1,083  854  968  1083 
Chi2  310.122  212.52 
F  14.718  19.893 
Hansen‐test(p‐val.)  0.385  0.262 
AR(1)‐test(p‐val.)  0.000  0.000 
AR(2)‐test(p‐val.)  0.875  0.802 
Instruments No.  67  1  57 
Notes: Dependent variable: growth rate in log debt per‐capita (deficit). Model (I) is estimated with the 
standard System‐GMM estimator. Model (II) is estimated with the Anderson‐Hsiao estimator using the 
second  lag  of  the  first  difference  as  instrument  for  the  lagged  dependent  variable.  Models  (III)  is 
estimated  with  Difference‐GMM  using  the  full  instrument  set.  Model  (IV)  is  estimated  with  the 
standard  fixed effects estimator.  Stars  indicate  significance  levels  at 10%  (*), 5%  (**)  and 1%  (***). 
Standard  errors  are  reported  in  parentheses.  All models with  cluster  and  heteroscedasticity  robust 
standard errors. 
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Table 6: Electoral cycles in Israeli municipalities, 1999-2009, replication with all 
municipalities (Jewish and Arab) 
         
   (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV) 
Election  0.088***  0.113***  0.156***  0.189*** 
[0.009]  [0.011]  [0.024]  [0.028] 
External  ‐0.095***  ‐0.040***  ‐0.065*** 
[0.012]  [0.012]  [0.012] 
Election x External  ‐0.128***  ‐0.135*** 
[0.024]  [0.024] 
“own revenues”  ‐0.302***  ‐0.210***  ‐0.255*** 
[0.038]  [0.034]  [0.036] 
Election x “own revenues”    ‐0.122***  ‐0.156*** 
[0.043]  [0.047] 
Unemployed  0.001  ‐0.001  0.001  0.001* 
  [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.001] 
Population  0.013  ‐0.103  0.029  0.012 
  [0.047]  [0.064]  [0.043]  [0.047] 
High debt  0.089***  0.071***  0.070***  0.084*** 
[0.010]  [0.011]  [0.010]  [0.010] 
Transfers p. c.  ‐0.486***  ‐0.069  ‐0.431***  ‐0.446*** 
[0.087]  [0.058]  [0.088]  [0.086] 
Trend  ‐0.001  ‐0.005**  ‐0.006***  ‐0.001 
[0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002] 
y(t‐1)  0.154***  0.166***  0.167***  0.148*** 
[0.031]  [0.031]  [0.031]  [0.031] 
N  1751  1751  1751  1751 
Municipalities  188  188  188  188 
Chi2  467.646  377.938  372.597  494.136 
Hansen‐test(p‐val.)  0.011  0.019  0.011  0.085 
AR(1)‐test(p‐val.)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
AR(2)‐test(p‐val.)  0.902  0.762  0.902  0.697 
Instruments No.  63  63  63  65 
Notes:  Dependent  variable:  growth  rate  in  log  debt  per‐capita (deficit).  All  models  estimated  with 
System‐GMM using the full instrument set. Stars indicate significance levels at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***). 
Standard errors are reported  in parentheses. All models with cluster and heteroscedasticity robust standard 
errors. 
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Table 7: Electoral cycles in Israeli Jewish municipalities, 1999-2009, Various 
robustness tests 
         
(I)  (II)  (III)  (IV) 
Election  688.129***  0.185***  0.197***  0.144*** 
[206.839]  [0.039]  [0.041]  (0.043) 
External  ‐346.418***  ‐0.061***  ‐0.051***  ‐0.053***
[80.572]  [0.014]  [0.015]  (0.015) 
Election x External  ‐679.359***  ‐0.134***  ‐0.149***  ‐0.135***
[189.210]  [0.026]  [0.029]  (0.028) 
Own revenues  ‐980.547***  ‐0.171***  ‐0.129  ‐0.124** 
[335.425]  [0.054]  [0.080]  (0.050) 
Election x Own revenues  ‐605.975**  ‐0.154***  ‐0.176***  ‐0.143** 
[304.018]  [0.060]  [0.063]  (0.059) 
Population  ‐86.92  ‐0.042  0.021  0.013 
[164.180]  [0.049]  [0.042]  [0.048] 
Unemployed  5.394*  0.001*  0.002***  0.002** 
[3.146]  [0.001]  [0.001]  (0.001) 
Election x Unemployed  0.003 
(0.002) 
High debt  123.232***  0.072***  0.071*** 
[36.280]  [0.011]  (0.011) 
Transfers p. c.  ‐2,001.021***  ‐0.432***  ‐0.283**  ‐0.276***
[523.738]  [0.107]  [0.134]  [0.085] 
Debt pc.  0.070*** 
[0.010] 
Trend  3.134  0.001  0.003  0.003 
[6.394]  [0.002]  [0.002]  (0.002) 
y(t‐1)  0.159*  0.149***  0.153***  0.153*** 
[0.092]  [0.037]  [0.038]  (0.038) 
N  1083  1083  1083  1083 
Municipalities  114  114  114  114 
Chi2  153.381  268.040  263.773  285.698 
Hansen‐test(p‐val.)  0.010  0.200  0.314  0.324 
AR(1)‐test(p‐val.)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
AR(2)‐test(p‐val.)  0.741  0.529  0.731  0.63 
Instruments No.  65  65  65  66 
Notes:  This  table  collects  results  from  four  robustness  tests.  In  column  (I),  we  use  as  dependent 
variable the annual difference  in debt per‐capita.  In column (II), we replace the dummy for high debt 
with the raw debt per‐capita.  In column (III), we replace own revenues with  lagged own revenues.  In 
column  (IV),  we  additionally  control  for  an  interaction  between  the  election  dummy  and  the 
unemployment rate. 
 
